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SECTION 1981 AND DISCRIMINATION IN
PRIVATE SCHOOLS
In McCrary v. Runyon' the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit became the first appellate court to extend the application of the
Civil Rights Act of 18662 to private schools. The court, sitting en banc,
held four to three that the parents of a black child who was excluded
from a private elementary school solely on the basis of his race were
denied the "same right. . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is
enjoyed by white citizens" 3, guaranteed by section 1981.
The rise in the number of private schools in the South can be
directly linked to federal enforcement of racial integration in the public
schools.4 Although segregation was declared unconstitutional in 1954,5
it was not until after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 19646 and
the Supreme Court's 1968 decision in Green v. County School BoardT
THE FOLLOWING CrTATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
Note, Desegregation of Private Schools: Section 1981 as an Alternative to State
Action, 62 GEO. L.J. 1363 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Private Schools];
Note, The Desegregation of Private Schools: Is Section 1981 the Answer?, 48
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1147 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Is 1981 the Answer?];
Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to Discriminate Versus Freedom
from Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Private Groups];
Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436 (1973) [herein-
after cited as Segregation Academies].
1. 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975) (en bane), affg sub nom. Gonzales v. Fairfax-
Brewster School, 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct.
354 (1975).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 et seq. (1970).
3. Id. § 1981.
4. Private Schools 1364; Is 1981 the Answer? 1148-49; Note, Post-Brown Private
White Schools-An Imperfect Dualism, 26 VAND. L. REv. 587 (1973); Segregation
Academies 1436; 7 LOYOLA OF L.A.L. REv. 634 (1974).
5. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (fourteenth amendment); Boil-
ing v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (fifth amendment).
6. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in various sections of 5, 28 & 42
U.S.C.).
7. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In Green the Court was confronted with a 'Yreedom-
of-choice" plan for desegregating the public schools of New Kent County, Virginia. Stu-
dents were allowed an annual choice as to which of the two available schools in the
county they wished to attend. During the plan's three years of operation no white stu-
dent had chosen to attend the all-black school, although 115 blacks were enrolled in the
formerly all-white school. The effect was that eighty-five percent of the black students
in the system still attended the all-black school.
Justice Brennan made it clear that the Court's patience had worn thin: "[A] plan
that at this late date fails to provide meaningful assurance of prompt and effective dis-
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that the growth of such schools became dramatic. 8  Until the Fourth
Circuit's decision in McCrary, redress for discrimination by a private
school in its admission policies could be had only after significant
government involvement in the "segregation academy"9 could be
shown."0 McCrary, however, extends the judiciary's reach to purely
establishment of a dual system is also intolerable. The time for mere "deliberate speed"
has run out' ... . The burden on a school board today is to come forward with a
plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now." Id.
at 438-39 (emphasis in original), quoting Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218
(1964) and Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown 1I).
The message apparently was received, because the level of integration achieved
since Green has been substantial. From the 1965-66 school year to the 1972-73 school
year, the percentage of Southern black students attending all-black schools dropped from
84.9 to 9.2 percent.
8. Estimated enrollment in Southern private schools, either begun or expanded in
response to desegregation, increased from approximately 25,000 in 1966 to about
535,000 in 1972. Terjen, Close-up on Segregation Academies, NEw SoUTH 50 (Fall
1972), cited in Segregation Academies 1441. See also Segregation Academies 1442
n.45. The Wall Street Journal reported that total private school enrollment in the South
went from 610,000 students to 859,000 students-a forty-one percent increase-in the
four years after Green was decided (1968-1972). Wall Street J., Dec. 17, 1973, at 17,
col. 3. It should be borne in mind that all such figures are very likely understated since
reporting by private schools is voluntary in some states. 'See Segregation Academies
1442 n.45.
9. A "segregation academy" has been defined as a private school "operated on a
racially segregated basis as an alternative available to white students seeking to avoid
desegregated public schools." Coffey v. Educational Fin. Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389,
1392 (S.D. Miss. 1969). Of course, not every Southern private school is a "segregation
academy." See generally Private Schools 1365 n.15; Segregation Academies 1443-44.
Perhaps the primary deleterious impact of segregation academies has been financial.
Since state funding to the public schools is normally based on the average daily attend-
ance, the desertion of the public facilities has also decreased funding. In addition, new
bond issues have met increasing resistance at the polls, and less support for public edu-
cation among legislatures and school boards has been observed. This is due at least in
part to the fact that a smaller percentage of the school-age population is now attending
public schools. See generally Private Schools 1366; Segregation Academies 1452-53.
10. Since discrimination was found unconstitutional under the fourteenth amend-
ment, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), state action had to be demon-
strated. Such government involvement has been found when public resources are made
available to private schools, either in the form of free textbooks, Norwood v. Harrison,
413 U.S. 455 (1973), all school materials, Hall v. School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D.
La. 1961), affid, 368 U.S. 515 (1962), or tuition grants, Poindexter v. Financial As-
sistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. La. 1967), affd, 389 U.S. 571 (1968). See
also Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affd sub nom. Coit v. Green,
404 U.S. 997 (1971); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
There is dictum advocating a liberalized state action approach in this area:
At the outset, one may question whether any school or college can ever be
so "private" as to escape the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . No
one any longer doubts that education is a matter affected with the greatest pub-
lic interest. And this is true whether it is offered by a public or private institu-
tion. ...
Reason and authority strongly suggest that the Constitution never sanc-
tions racial discrimination in our schools and colleges, no matter how "private"
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private discrimination on the basis of race. The segregation academies
are no longer immune."
The serious implications of the issues at stake in McCrary have not
gone unnoticed by the Supreme Court, which has granted certiorari.' 2
This Note will examine the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in light of
Supreme Court precedents and an analysis of section 1981 itself, and
will explore the potential ramifications of the decision on this crucial
question.
REVIVAL OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866
Under the enforcement power of the thirteenth amendment,' 3 Con-
gress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1866.'4 In sweeping terms, section
one of that Act guaranteed certain civil rights to all persons born in the
they may claim to be. Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F.
Supp. 855, 858-59 (E.D. La. 1962) (Wright, J.).
Although some authors have recently expressed approval for this type of argument,
see Note, Post-Brown Private White Schools, supra note 4; Comment, Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer Co. Extended to Private Education: Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School,
Inc., 122 U. PA. L. REv. 471, 479-82 (1973), no court has adopted such an expansive
view of state action. But cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Indeed, the
position has been undercut by the Supreme Court's holding that education is not a fund-
amental right. See Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). The
better view, therefore, is that state action can "no longer be heavily relied upon to de-
segregate private schools. State involvement in private schools has become relatively
subtle and provides little basis for finding state action in most cases." Private Schools
1368.
11. Many states have prohibited discrimination in at least some of their private
schools. No Southern states are among their number. For a listing of such statutes
see Private Groups 1460-61 n.97. Several of the acts are modeled after section 502
of the Model Anti-Discrimination Act of the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(1966), which states that it is a discriminatory practice for a private or public educa-
tional institution "to exclude, expel, limit, or otherwise discriminate against an individual
seeking admission as a student. . . in the terms, conditions, and privileges of the insti-
tution, because of race, color, religion, or national origin . . . ." Although the com-
mentators seem convinced that such statutes are constitutional, see Dorsen, Racial Dis-
crimination in "Private" Schools, 9 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 39, 47 (1967); Fox, Discrim-
ination and Antidiscrimination in Massachusetts Law, 44 BosToN U.L R1~v. 30, 71
(1964); Private Groups 1461, they have reportedly been ineffective because of sporadic
enforcement. Dorsen, supra, at 48; cf. Symposium, Fair Employment Practices Acts, 14
BUFF. L. Rnv. 1 (1964). See generally Note, Fair Educational Practices Acts: A Solu-
tion to Discrimination?, 64 HARv. L. REV. 307 (1950).
12. 96 S. Ct. 354 (1975).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII states:
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropri-
ate legislation.
14. Act of April 9, 1866, c. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
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United States.'5 It granted the newly enfranchised black the same
rights as a white citizen to contract and to buy, sell and hold both real
and personal property. 16
Until recently, however, this section had not been utilized to attack
private discrimination because of the Supreme Court's famous decision
in the Civil Rights Cases.'7  There the Court acknowledged that Con-
gress had authority under the thirteenth amendment "to enact all neces-
sary and proper laws for the obliteration and prevention of slavery with
all its badges and incidents,"1 s but interpreted the phrase "badges and
incidents" narrowly. 19 According to Justice Bradley, applying the thir-
teenth amendment to every refusal to accommodate a black "would be
running the slavery argument into the ground. 20
15. The Act actually declared "[tihat all persons born in the United States and not
subject to any foreign power, . . . are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States
." The Act proceeded to enumerate the rights of such "citizens." Act of April 9,
1866, c. 31, § I, 14 Stat. 27. In the 1870 reenactment, protection was extended to all
persons. Act of May 31, 1870, c. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 140, 144 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981 & 1982 (1970)).
16. [S]uch citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude,. . . shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens . . . . Act of April 9, 1866, c. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, re-enacted by § 18
of the Enforcement Act of 1870, Act of May 31, 1870, c. 114, § 18, 16 Stat.
140, 144 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1982 (1970)).
17. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875
which, in addition to re-enacting the 1866 Act in toto, see note 16 supra, prohibited
racial discrimination in the use of "inns, public conveyances on land and water, thea-
tres, and other places of public amusement . . . ." Act of March 1, 1875, c. 114, §
1, 18 Stat. 335. For the text of the Act see the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 9
(1883). Congress asserted that the power for such an enactment flowed from both the
thirteenth and fourteenth amendments. As to the latter amendment, the Court held that
state action alone was affected.
18. 109 U.S. at 21.
19. One commentator has pointed out that what is considered by society as a badge
and incident of slavery can and does vary with time. "IMhe banning of a man from
a restaurant because of his race may well loom much larger as a vestige of slavery
[now) than it did in 1883." Larson, The New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wis. L.
Rav. 470, 489-90.
20. 109 U.S. at 24. There was, of course, a famous and spirited dissent by Justice
Harlan. He prophesied a second-class citizen status for the freedmen. Id. at 61-62
(Harlan, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Cruikshank, 25 F. Cas. 707 (No.
14,897) (C.C.La. 1874) (Bradley, Circuit Judge), aff'd, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
In holding that refusing to render services to blacks "has nothing to do with slavery
or involuntary servitude," 109 U.S. at 24, the majority was also seen to have limited
legislation under the thirteenth amendment to prohibitions against "enforced compul-
sory service." See Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926); Hodges v. United States,
203 U.S. 1 (1906). This reading has been discredited by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968).
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Eighty-five years later, the Supreme Court scuttled this restrictive
approach to Congress' power under the thirteenth amendment in Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 21 Relying in part on section 1982,22 a portion
of section one of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Mr. Jones claimed relief
because he was denied purchase of a house solely for the reason that he
was a black man. The majority, recounting that the thirteenth amend-
ment gives Congress the power to abolish all "badges and incidents" of
slavery,23 upheld his claim.24 "[W]hen racial discrimination herds men
With regard to the fourteenth amendment, the majority announced that "state ac-
tion" must be present. 109 U.S. at 10-11. See generally Note, Federal Power to Regu-
late Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruc-
tion Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 449, 450-54 (1974).
21. 392U.S. 409 (1968).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have
the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
23. 392 U.S. at 439, quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). The ma-
jority avoided the question of whether the Civil Rights Cases Court would have regarded
the instant situation as a badge or incident of slavery. See 392 U.S. at 441 n.78. But
see id. at 451 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Dis-
crimination, supra note 20, at 466-68.
24. The analysis in Jones was straightforward. The Court found, first, that the Fair
Housing Title of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81, did not
preempt or undercut section 1982. 392 U.S. at 413-17. After distinguishing several
cases, id. at 417-20 (primarily discussed Was Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948)), the
Court "for the first time," 392 U.S. at 420, confronted the issue of whether section 1982
reached private discrimination. A positive answer was based on a plain reading of the
statute, id. at 420-22, the structure of the statute, id. at 422-26, and its legislative history,
id. at 426-37. Finally the Court asked whether Congress had power under the thirteenth
amendment to enact section 1982 as construed and concluded that it did. Id. at 437-
44.
The historical accuracy of the majority's conclusion has been a heated question.
Justice Harlan in dissent amassed almost twenty pages of material "to show that those
debates do not, as the Court would have it, overwhelmingly support the result reached
by the Court, and in fact. . .a contrary conclusion may equally well be drawn." Id.
at 454-73.
One commentator has contended that "when legislative history is being adduced to
prove that words do not 'mean what they say' it is not enough to show that the inference
urged by the dissent, in Justice Harlan's words, 'may equally well be drawn."' Larson,
supra note 19, at 488. However, Justice Harlan also questioned the self-evident nature
of section 1982. 392 U.S. at 452-54.
As to the debate over which historical interpretation is correct, the following au-
thors support the majority position: W. BROCK, AN AMERICAN CRISIS 111 et seq.
(1963); L. & J. Cox, POLITICS, PRINCIPLE, AND PREJUDICE, 1865-1866 ch. 10 (1963);
J. MCPHERSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALry (1965); Kinoy, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.: An Historic Step Forward, 22 VAND. L. REV. 475 (1969); Benedict, Book Review,
39 U. CH. L. REV. 862, 869-70 (1972). The following authors support the dissent's
position: H. BEALE, THE CRITcIAL YEAR: A STUDY OF ANDREW JOHNSON AND RE-
CONSTRUCTION (1930); W. DUNNING, RECONSTRUCTION: POLITCAL AND ECONOMIC
1865-1877 (1907, reissued 1962); 6 C. FAnlmAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
THm UNrrED STATES 1257 et seq. (1971); Casper, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.: Clio,
Vol. 1976:125]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property turn on the color of
their skin, then it too is a relic of slavery. 25
Two recent Supreme Court opinions have made it clear that the
Court no longer intends that section 1982 be read restrictively. In
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc."' the Court granted damages to a
black lessee when the defendant refused to honor the transfer of the
lessor's assignable membership share solely because of the lessee's
race.2 7  Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Association, Inc.28
presented a similar problem. There a unanimous Court granted relief
to a black homeowner under section 1982 when he was not permitted to
use the community pool because of his race.29  The Court considered
the opportunity to enjoy the pool an attractive feature of that particular
residential area, and reasoned that denial of the possibility of member-
ship in the pool association abridged and diluted the claimant's right to
acquire a home. 0
The lower courts have heeded the Supreme Court's admonition
that a "narrow construction of the language of § 1982 would be quite
inconsistent with the broad and sweeping nature of the protection meant
to be afforded by section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 . . .from
which § 1982 was derived. . . ."3 Section 1981, also derived from
section one of the 1866 Act, similarly has been given a broad reading by
the courts.3 2 The "same right . . . to make and enforce contracts"
language has been extended primarily to the employment situation, 3
Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 Sup. Cr. REV. 89; Ervin, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.: Judicial Activism Run Riot, 22 VAND. L. REV. 485 (1969).
25. 392 U.S. at 442-43. The Court applied the formula of McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819), to demonstrate the constitutionality of section
1982. 392 U.S. at 443-44.
26. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
27. Id. at 236, 238-40.
28. 410 U.S. 431 (1973); see 23 CATH. L. REV. 147 (1973).
29. The plaintiffs also sought to enjoin the association's racially restrictive guest
policy under section 1981. 410 U.S. at 439-40. The Court remanded this issue to the
lower court, where an injunction was granted. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recrea-
tional Ass'n, 367 F. Supp. 860 (D. Md. 1973), aff'd, 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975).
30. 410 U.S. at 437.
31. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969); see, e.g., Sims
v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 343 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1972); Terry
v. Elmwood Cemetery, 307 F. Supp. 369 (N.D. Ala. 1969). See generally Brook, Non-
discrimination in Sale or Rental of Real Property: Comment on Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co. and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 22 VAND. L. REv. 455
(1969); Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination, supra note 20; 1975
BRIGHAM YOUNG L. RaV. 141; 88 HtAv. L REv. 1610 (1975).
32. See generally Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination, supra
note 20, at 477-86.
33. Bowers v. Campbell, 505 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974) (federal civilian employee
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and the Supreme Court has recently given its approval to such a
policy.34 In addition, section 1981 has been applied to admission to
privately-owned recreational facilities,38 private hospitals," training
schools, 3 7 and, in McCrary v. Runyon, to private elementary schools.3 '
McCrary v. Runyon: SECTION 1981 AND PRiVATE EDUCATION
In McCrary v. Runyon the parents of black children learned of the
private schools involved through mass mailings addressed to "Resident"
and through advertisements in the Yellow Pages of the telephone
book.39 They inquired about admission at both schools, but in each
case were informed that only members of the Caucasian race were
accepted.4 0 The parents brought actions under section 1981, alleging
that they were being denied the same right as a white citizen to make a
sued the officers of a United States Air Station); Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp.,
498 F.2d 641 (5th Cir. 1974); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974);
Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Brady v. Bristol-
Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1972); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Machine
Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972); Young v. Interna-
tional Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works,
427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970).
34. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975). The Court
there stated, "[I]t is well settled among the Federal Courts of Appeals-and we now
join them-that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against discrimination in private em-
ployment on the basis of race." Id. at 459-60 (citations omitted). Justices Marshall,
Douglas, and Brennan concurred with this statement. See id. at 470-71 (Marshall,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.).
35. Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974); Scott
v. Young, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970).
36. United States v. Medical Soc'y, 298 F. Supp. 145 (D.S.C. 1969). See also Scott
v. Eversole Mortuary, 522 F.2d 1110 (9th Cir. 1975).
37. Grier v. Specialized Skills, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C. 1971).
38. 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), affg Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc.,
363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 354 (1975).
39. McCrary is a combination of two cases which present nearly identical fact situ-
ations. The parents of Colon Gonzales applied at Fairfax-Brewster School after receiv-
ing an advertisement in the mail and hearing of the school from a friend whose son
attended there. The application was returned. Upon inquiry about the rejection, Mr.
Gonzales was informed that the school was not integrated. 515 F.2d at 1084-85.
Both the Gonzaleses and Mrs. McCrary phoned Bobbe's School about enrolling
their sons. They were told that only members of the Caucasian race were accepted.
Id. at 1085. No application was made to Bobbe's School, but the majority agreed that
it would be "ridiculous to require this of the plaintiffs after they had effectively been
told it was useless." Id.
The Southern Independent School Association intervened in both actions. It is an
association representing more than 300 private, nonprofit schools in the South, some of
which it concedes are racially discriminatory. The position of the Association is that
such discrimination is not prohibited by section 1981 and, in any event, cannot be con-
stitutionally prevented. See id. at 1084.
40. Id. at 1085.
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contract. The district court, in a much noted opinion,41 agreed, found
section 1981 applicable, and granted relief.42
The Fourth Circuit, in affirming the district court decision, first
rejected the contention" that section 1981 had only the limited objective
of removing the legal disabilities of the Black Codes.44  Relying heavily
on Jones and Tillman and noting that sections 1981 and 1982 have a
common origin, the majority answered that the statute certainly did
nullify such state laws. But, the court added, "it did much more than
that."'45  Section 1981, like section 1982, was intended to prohibit all
discrimination against nonwhites,46 private as well as state-sanctioned.47
The court next disposed of constitutional challenges to the statute
on the basis of the defendants' freedom of association and their right of
41. See Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination, supra note 20; Pri-
vate Schools; Is 1981 the Answer?; Comment, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., supra note
10; Segregation Academies; 11 HOUSTON L. REV. 691 (1974); 7 LOYOLA OF L.A.L. REV.
634 (1974); 45 Miss. L.J. 246 (1974); 42 U. CN. L. REV. 767 (1973).
42. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973),
aff'd sub nom. McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct.
354 (1975).
43. The majority preliminarily disposed of the assertion that the facts as found by
the district court were clearly erroneous. 515 F.2d at 1085-86.
44. Apparently overlooked by the majority was the fact that it was a felony in the
slave states to teach slaves to read and write prior to the adoption of the thirteenth
amendment. See, e.g., GA. STAT. LAW ch. xxx, §§ 59 & 60 (Hotchkiss 1848) (prohibited
teaching slaves to read and write); id. § 61 (prohibited sale of books to slaves or colored
persons for their own use); id. § 62 (prohibited employing slaves or colored persons in
printing offices). One commentator has sought to demonstrate that one of the purposes
of the thirteenth amendment was to provide equal education for blacks even though the
statutory history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 does not specifically mention education.
See Note, The Thirteenth Amendment and Education: An Unfulfilled Promise, 20
S.D.L. REv. 418 (1975). Among the passages from the debates garnered in support of
this thesis is the following statement of Senator Wilson:
If this amendment shall be incorporated. . . into the Constitution. .. , it will
obliterate the last lingering vestiges of the slave system; its chattelizing, degrad-
ing, and bloody codes. . . . [ihe school-house will rise to enlighten the
darkened intellect of a race imbruted by long years of enforced ignorance. 34
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1324 (1864), cited in Note, supra, at
423-24.
Senator Johnson used the rhetorical:
Why are these poor creatures kept in a state of absolute ignorance? Why is
education, the most humble, denied them? Why are the Holy Scriptures kept
from their hovels? Why? Can there be but one answer: that if they knew
what knowledge imparts, if they knew what the gospel of our Savior inculcates,
they would be freemen, or sooner or later die in the effort to obtain it? 34
CONG. GLOBE, supra, at 1424.
45. 515 F.2d at 1086.
46. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 421-22 (1968).
47. 515 F.2d at 1086-87. The majority also quickly rejected the far-fetched notion
that for section 1981 to come into play admission to the school would have to be open
to all white citizens. Of course, many white people are restricted because of academic
or financial background, age, and even geography from entering an elementary school.
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privacy. Freedom of association provides no help to the schools here,
the court held, because the discontinuance of their discriminatory admis-
sion practices would in no way inhibit the teaching of any ideas or
dogma.48 Likewise, section 1981 does not impede parents from sending
their children to private schools which present ideas or use educational
methods which are not available in the public schools. 49 Turning to the
right of privacy, the court acknowledged that certain "intimate and
private affairs" are constitutionally protected from intrusion.2 The
court, however, did not find application of this principle appropriate in
the case: "[w]hen a school holds itself open to the public, . . .or even
to those applicants meeting established qualifications, there is no per-
ceived privacy of the sort that has been given constitutional protec-
tion." 1
SECTION 1981: AN INTERPRETATION
The majority opinion in McCrary, examined in the light of prior
Supreme Court holdings, apparently is the correct one. The dissenting
members of the Fourth Circuit argued, however, that section 1981 was
not intended to reach purely private discrimination in education. 2 In
addition, they urged that extending the reach of the statute into the
private school context would create impermissible conflicts with the
Similar facts did not bar application of section 1982 in Sullivan and Tillman. The
proper application of the statute looks to the "qualified class." Id. at 1087. If both
whites and nonwhites are included in that class, then section 1981 (and section 1982)
forbids the nonwhites of the class to be accorded inferior rights solely because of their
race. See notes 86-91 infra and accompanying text.
48. Id. at 1087; cf. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
49. 515 F.2d at 1087. See also Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
50. 515 F.2d at 1088. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
51. 515 F.2d at 1088. The majority also refused to read Norwood v. Harrison, 413
U.S. 455 (1973), as providing a constitutionally protected right to discriminate. 515
F.2d at 1088. The statement undoubtedly relied on most strongly by the petitioners
was Lhe following: "This case does not raise any question as to the right of citizens
to maintain private schools with admission limited to students of particular national ori-
gins, race or religion .... ." 413 U.S. at 457. The obvious intent here, though, was
to leave the issue open. The Court in Norwood also stated: "Such private bias is not
barred by the Constitution, nor does it invoke any sanction of laws, but neither can it
call on the Constitution for material aid from the State." Id. at 469. The Court, how-
ever, went on to qualify this statement by noting that "even some private discrimination
is subject to special remedial legislation in certain circumstances under § 2 of the Thir-
teenth Amendment .... ." Id. at 470. Of course, section 1981 is such remedial legisla-
tion passed under the thirteenth amendment. Thus, the McCrary dissent's recourse to
Norwood, 515 F.2d at 1096-97, is particularly unpersuasive. See also Private Schools
1389-91.
52. 515 F.2d at 1093-94.
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constitutional rights of privacy and freedom of association.58 Testing
the validity of these objections must begin with an interpretation of the
statute itself.
A. Section 1981 Reaches Private Discrimination
The dissenting judges in McCrary suggested that section 1981
should not be read as broadly as was section 1982 in Jones and Sullivan.
However, in addition to the dissenters' colleagues on the Fourth Circuit,
the eight other circuits that have considered the question have all
rejected such a reading,5 4 agreeing that the two sister statutes must be
treated similarly. The key point is that both section 1981 and section
1982 are derived from the same section of the 1866 Act. That provi-
sion was artificially divided upon codification,55 a fact recognized by the
Supreme Court in Jones and in Tillman.5" More importantly, the Court
in Jones overruled a prior decision which had interpreted section 1981
narrowly. 7 Finally, to put an end to the suggestion that section 1981
does not reach purely private discrimination, attention should be given
to the recent case of Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,5" where
the Supreme Court unanimously confirmed that section 1981 reaches
private discrimination in the context of employment. 59
53. Id. at 1094-96.
54. See Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1975); Bowers v. Campbell,
505 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1974); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974);
Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974); Baker v. F &
F Investment Co., 489 F.2d 829 (7th Cir. 1973); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc.,
478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir.
1972); Young v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971).
55. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, was initially codified in
sections 1977 and 1978 of the Revised Statutes of 1874.
56. See 392 U.S. at 422 n.28; 410 U.S. at 439-40.
57. 392 U.s. at 441 n.78. The case overruled was Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S.
1 (1906). In Hodges it was held that several black men had no cause of action under
section 1981 when a group of white men assaulted and "terrorized" them in order to
prevent their working in a sawmill. The majority ieasoned that this activity did not
operate "to reduce the individual to a condition of slavery," id. at 18, and thus was not
reached by the thirteenth amendment.
58. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
59. Id. at 459-60, 470-71. Justice Marshall in concurrence stated the position of
the Court:
A full exposition of the statutory origins of 1981 with respect to prohibi-
tion against private acts of discrimination is set out in Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co. In construing § 1982, a sister provision to § 1981, we concluded
that Congress intended to prevent private discriminatory deprivations of all
the rights enumerated in § 1 of the 1866 Act, including the right to contract.
The Court's recognition of a proscription in § 1981 against private acts of em-
ployment discrimination . . . reaffirms that the early Civil Rights Acts reflect
congressional intent to "speak ... of all deprivations ...whatever their
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The McCrary dissent also asserted that the word "right" in sections
1981 and 1982 does not necessarily have the same meaning in all
contexts. A mere freedom from legal disability to own property would
be of little value if no owner would sell to a black man. Section 1982,
then, must reach the private real estate market if a black man is not to
be denied the "right" to own and enjoy property. But, the dissent
argued, public schools and nondiscriminatory private schools carry the
vast bulk of the education burden in this country. Consequently, a
nonwhite would not be denied a substantial right to an education if
section 1981 were not given full play.
This argument fails on both practical and legal grounds. Practi-
cally speaking, no parent pays both public school taxes and private
school tuition unless he feels that his child is receiving a substantial
additional benefit from the private school.60 As a legal matter, the
word "right" has the same meaning in section 1981 as in section 1982
since only one "right" was mentioned in section one of the 1866 Act.61
Moreover, the reasoning urged by the dissent not only requires divergent
readings of the word "right," but also of the word "contract." A
contract of employment would be within the purview of section 1981,62
but a contract for education would not. The necessity of ad hoc inquiry
each time a complex or new type of contract is presented to the court
militates strongly against any such approach.
source." Id. at 471 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted), quoting Griffin
v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971).
See also Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973). In Till-
man the Court remanded the case for consideration of whether the association's racially
restrictive guest policy should be struck down under section 1981. On remand the court
struck it down. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 367 F. Supp. 860
(D. Md. 1973), afI'd, 517 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir. 1975).
60. Situations can be easily imagined where the education provided in private
schools in the area is vastly superior to that of the public schools. This situation is
at least partially exacerbated by the white flight to segregation academies. The public
schools are made substantially one-race schools again and Brown is sapped of its vitality.
See Is 1981 the Answer? 1171-72. See generally Segregation Academies. In addition,
in some cases the choice is between a private school or no school, such as when a child
misses the first grade or kindergarten age cutoff for the state. In Durham, North Caro-
lina, there is a lottery each year to allocate the few spaces available in the public kinder-
gartens.
The argument that there are other private schools available which do not have dis-
criminatory admissions policies is not convincing because, first, there are often no ac-
ceptable substitutes, especially in smaller communities, and, second, even if there are,
the parents have demonstrated that the school in question best suits their and their
child's needs by the very fact of application. Surely the choice of a school is for the
parents to make. Cf. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
61. For the text of the statute see note 16 supra.
62. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975).
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B. What Is the "Same Right"?
In Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co."3 a Seventh Circuit panel
granted relief to a black woman under section 1982 when her race was
only one of several factors in a negative apartment rental decision.64 The
district court had denied relief because, although some racial animus
was present, a white woman would have been rejected as a tenant under
the same circumstances. 5 The appellate court's decision must be re-
jected since it violates logic, precedent, and a common-sense reading of
the statutory language. 68
The Smith panel founded its conclusion on the statement in Jones
that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 applies to all racial discrimination.6 T
However, examination of the context in which this statement is made
clearly reveals that by "all" the Supreme Court simply meant that the
Act reaches both private and governmental activity.68  In addition the
Court had earlier stated that "whatever else it may be. . . § 1982 is not
a comprehensive open housing law."'6 9
Although it has not explicitly ruled on the matter, the Supreme
Court has been exceedingly careful in its 1866 Act decisions to point out
that racial discrimination has been the only reason for the denial of
rights. In other words, the denial would not have occurred "but for"
the racial factor.70  This was the state of the record in Jones,7 in
Sullivan where the Court found Little Hunting Park to be open to all
whites in the geographical area, "there being no selective element other
63. 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1970).
64. The court stated, "We read this to hold that the 'same right! means that race
is an impermissible factor in an apartment rental decision and that it cannot be brushed
aside because it was neither the sole reason for discrimination nor the total factor of
discrimination. We find no acceptable place in the law for partial racial discrimina-
tion." Id. at 349-50.
65. Mrs. Smith had a child and the apartments had an established policy against
renting to employed parents with infant children. Id. at 349.
66, But see Private Schools 1383-84 (result in Smith defended).
67. 436 F.2d at 349, citing Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 'U.S. 409, 421-22
(1968).
68. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 421-22 (1968). "On its face,
therefore, § 1982 appears to prohibit all discrimination against Negroes in the sale or
rental of property-discrimination by private owners as well as discrimination by public
authorities." Id. at 421.
69. Id. at 413. In comparison, note that in an action under the Fair Housing Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970), "[i]t is enough that race was one significant factor
[the defendant] considered in his dealings with the men." United States v. Pelzer
Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir. 1973).
70. See Riley v. Adirondack S. School for Girls, 368 F. Supp. 392, 398 (M.D. Fla.
1973).
71. 392 U.S. at 412.
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than race, ' 72 and in Tillman where the Court again found "no plan or
purpose of exclusiveness" except race. 73
The Fourth Circuit properly followed the Supreme Court prece-
dent in McCrary:
What we have said should not be read to call into question the
right of the school to insist upon an evenhanded requirement of aca-
demic and other racially neutral qualifications. Indeed, the right of the
school to be selective on these bases is unquestioned here. All that is
contended and all that we hold is that § 1981 prohibits the rejection
of a black applicant when his qualifications meet all other requirements
and race is the only basis for his rejection.7 4
The conclusion of the Fourth Circuit is strongly supported not only
by precedent but by a common-sense reading of section 1981. The
statute guarantees to all citizens the same, or equal, right as white
citizens to perform certain acts. The purpose of the statute was to put
the races on the same footing. It granted blacks equal, not superior,
rights.
Section 1981 does not begin to operate until the appropriate class
of people is ascertained. For instance, obviously not every citizen can
join the Boy Scouts, for the organization imposes valid restrictions on
both sex and age.75  Assuming that the eligible group consists of male
72. 396U.S.at236.
73. 410 U.S. at 438, quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229,
236 (1969).
74. 515 F.2d at 1087 (emphasis added). Later, speaking more generally, the court
elaborated:
Indeed, § 1981 does not purport to reach all private associations. It
reaches only those which evidence "no plan or purpose of exclusiveness" other
than race . . . . Private associations having non-racial criteria for the selec-
tion of members may apply their criteria, even if it results in a disproportionate
impact upon the members of one race. It is only when blacks are excluded
because they are black, or denied a right to contract which would be granted
were they white, that § 1981 is violated. Id. at 1088, citing Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
See also Boyd v. Lefrak Organization, 509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir. 1975) (landlord's racially
neutral renting requirement upheld even though it disproportionately affected blacks and
Puerto Ricans); Madison v. Jeffers, 494 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1974) (owner who took land
off market because of tax advice rather than for racial reason not liable under section
1982, notwithstanding the fact that such tax advice later proved erroneous). "The civil
rights statutes as interpreted make clear that one who sells or leases real estate '[has]
a right to refuse approval on any honest basis unrelated to the race of the prospective
purchaser."' Id. at 117, quoting Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Cooperative Bldg.,
463 F.2d 1055, 1066 (7th Cir. 1972).
75. Even this position, however, has undergone recent court challenges. Cf. Magill
v. Avondale Baseball Conference, 516 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir. 1975) (case dismissed on
finding of insufficient state action); Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d
344 (1st Cir. 1974) (finding of state action resulted in remand to determine if injunc-
tion prohibiting discrimination on basis of sex should issue). See also N.Y. Times, Sept.
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citizens between the ages of ten and eighteen, the next inquiry is
whether any nonwhites are members of this qualified class.78  If so,
section 1981 dictates that they cannot be denied admission solely on
account of their race.77  Stated somewhat differently, a black man of
twenty-five could not compel his acceptance into the Boy Scouts even if
the organization had a racially discriminatory admissions policy. He
would be legitimately excluded for the nonracial reason that he was too
old.78
It has been argued that utilization of the "but for" test in section
1981 cases makes enforcement "practically impossible" since, if a de-
fendant may consider race, other selective elements are likely to be mere
excuses. 79  It is further suggested that the existence of other factors
which justify rejection should go only to the issue of damages. 80 Al-
though admittedly there is some reason for concern in this area, the
danger does not necessitate a tampering with the plain language of
section 1981. Congress has provided other comprehensive remedies
against racial discrimination, most notably in the Civil Rights Acts of
28, 1975, at 35, col. 1 (Cub Scout pack charter revoked for having female pack leader
where organization bylaws require a man).
76. See Love v. DeCarlo Homes, Inc., 482 F.2d 613 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1115 (1973). In Love blacks alleged that they were sold homes at exorbitant and
onerous prices due to a scarcity of housing in the area. The Fifth Circuit dismissed
their section 1981 claim because they had presented no evidence showing that whites
were sold homes on more favorable terms. But see Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc.,
501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974).
77. The adverb "solely" is used here to indicate that even if a black is a member
of the class, he is still not guaranteed admission any more than a white member of the
class. For instance, there could be 100 potential class members all seeking ten available
positions. Both a lottery and a first come-first served waiting list method would be ac-
ceptable, nonracial methods of differentiating among members of the class. Race, of
course, would not be.
78. The court in Riley v. Adirondack S. School for Girls, 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D.
Fla. 1973), gives the following example:
Assume . . . that Black and White simultaneously apply for membership in
any given organization. Black is refused for reasons R (race) and X (age or
sex or any other nonpretextual, albeit arbitrary criteria). White is also refused
due to reason X alone. Black has been victimized by racial discrimination, but
his right to contract was the same as that enjoyed by White. That is, even if
the race factor had been eliminated . . ., the result would remain precisely the
same, and would have been obtained for the same reason. And, under those
circumstances, if the racial consideration was deemed to be violative of the
statute and thus remediable, the inevitable effect would be to confer upon Black
a higher or superior right to contract, not the same or equivalent right. Id. at
398.
It should be noted that the conclusion of the court in Riley that the nonracial criteria
for rejection of the black child were not mere pretexts is far from convincing. See Pri-
vate Schools 1383-84 & n.1 12; Is 1981 the Answer? 1173-74 (criticizes Riley for mixing
the "but for" test and the private club sole criterion distinction).
79. Private Schools 1383.
80. Id. at 1384.
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196481 and the Civil Obedience Act of 1968.82 Moreover, the federal
courts have had long experience in the art of disposing of pretexts
designed to mask unlawful discrimination.83 In sum, if the reason is
not a mere pretext, the plaintiff should have no right of action and dam-
ages, mitigated or otherwise, should not be awarded.
Since both section 1981 and section 1982 guarantee to nonwhites
only the "same right[s)" enjoyed by white citizens, the scope of the
protection afforded by the two sections cannot be ascertained without
asking exactly what rights whites have in the relevant contexts. In the
case of section 1981, one must understand what right a white citizen has
to "make and enforce. . . a contract"; for section 1982, the question is
what right does a white citizen have to "purchase' or "sell" property.
The precise issue being examined here would seem to belabor the
obvious. Nevertheless, the failure to come to grips with the question
has led the courts84 and the commentators 5 to attribute an unwarranted
scope to these sections.
The point, which has yet to be sufficiently articulated, is that no
person, white or black, can legally force another to accept his offer. A
simple example framed in terms of section 1982's guarantee of the
"same right to . . . purchase" real property will illustrate the point
which, it should be stressed, also limits the protection of section 1981.
Jones, a black man, wishes to buy a house now owned by Smith. if
Smith places his house on the market, with ads in the local paper and a
"for sale" sign on the front lawn, there is now no doubt that Jones does
have a right to purchase Smith's home.86 That is, if Jones "accepts"
81. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at various sections of titles 5, 28, & 42
U.S.C.). Specific remedies are provided in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-d, 2000a to h-6
(1970).
82. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified at various sections of titles 18, 25,
28, & 42 U.S.C.).
83. Such superficial reasons were discarded by the court in McCrary itself, 515 F.2d
at 1084-86. See also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Green v. County
School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964);
Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974);
Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333, 1340-42 (2d Cir. 1974); cf.
Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070
(1974); Note, Racial Discrimination in Public Housing: Rights and Remedies, 41 U.
Cm. L. REv. 582, 584-94 (1974). But cf. McAdory v. Scientific Research Instruments,
Inc., 355 F. Supp. 468 (D. Md. 1973).
84. See, e.g., Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182,
1198 (D. Conn. 1974).
85. See, e.g., Comment, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., supra note 10, at 476-79.
86. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). This example does
not intend to consider what relevance other statutes, such as the Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. (1970), may have. See Johnson v. Zaremba, 381 F. Supp. 165
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Smith's offer by tendering the requested purchase price,87 Smith cannot
refuse to go through with the deal solely because he prefers not to sell to
a black. Any other interpretation of the statute would not guarantee to
Jones the "same right" that a white citizen would have in this
situation-any white citizen who "accepts" the terms of Smith's offer by
tendering the requested price would have a right to enforce this uni-
lateral contract.8 8
If, however, Smith has not "offered" to sell his house in a manner
such that a unilateral contract is formed, Jones cannot force him to sell
the house simply by tendering the fair market value (or a higher figure)
of the property. This is so even though Smith's motive in refusing to
sell is wholly discriminatory. In other words, even though Smith would
have sold the house to any white person who made the same offer that
Jones did, Smith is immune from a section 1982 action so long as he
has not placed the house on the market.8 9 Again, this understanding of
(N.D. I1. 1973) (Fair Housing Act and Civil Rights Act of 1866 give complementary
but distinct remedies).
87. Corbin states that an "offer creates a power of acceptance in the offeree." 1
A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 11, at 24 (1963). Explaining further, he writes, "An offer
is an act on the part of one person whereby he gives to another the legal power of creat-
ing the obligation called contract. An acceptance is the exercise of the power conferred
by the offer, by the performance of some other act or acts. Both offer and acceptance
must be acts expressing assent." Id. at 24 n.18. See also Moore v. Townsend, 525 F.2d
482 (7th Cir. 1975) (offeror's attempt to reject acceptance due to race not allowed).
88. "A unilateral contract consists of a promise or group of promises made by one
of the contracting parties only. . . ." 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 87, § 21, at 31 (1963).
See generally id. §§ 62-94 (acceptance of an offer); id. § 152 (mutuality); 1 W. JAEGER,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 13, 64-69, 102-02A (3d ed. 1957) (consideration). We
are assuming that the example given in the text is a unilateral contract offer. Of course,
whether it is such an offer or is merely an invitation requesting offers is a factual ques-
tion to be resolved in each case. See 1 A. CORBIN, supra note 87, § 23. For discus-
sion of the proper treatment of invitations under sections 1981 and 1982 see notes 92-
97 infra and accompanying text.
There is no need for a new federal common law of contracts to be developed espe-
cially for section 1981 actions. Since the statute guarantees the same right to all persons,
utilizing the law of the jurisdiction in which the court sits will be permissible and proper
since its application will be evenhanded with respect to whites and nonwhites. Simply put,
applying a federal common law different from the applicable state law in a section 1981
action would be denying a black man the "same right" which a white citizen of the state
has, regardless of whether it helped or hurt the particular nonwhite litigant in a particu-
lar circumstance. See Player v. Dep't of Pensions & Security, 400 F. Supp. 249 (M.D.
Ala. 1975).
89. This is not to say that Smith's motive for the refusal is relevant to this stage of a
section 1981 or 1982 inquiry. It is not. The important consideration is that no white
person has a right to force him to sell his property. See notes 90-91 infra and accom-
panying text. Consequently, since a black person has only the same right as a white per-
son, Jones as a black man cannot force the sale either. This fully comports with contract
law since no one can create a legally enforceable obligation with another solely by rea-
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the statut&s scope flows directly from the "same right" language. No
white citizen whose offer to purchase is rejected by Smith has any legal
right to force Smith into the transaction, making Jones' "same right" in
actuality "no right." (Indeed, any other interpretation of the section
would be unconstitutional. 90 ) To give Jones relief would be to grant
him a greater right than a white citizen would have hadV1
An intermediate situation between a unilateral contract and a
forced sale is presented when an invitation rather than an offer is
extended by an individual wishing to sell property or make a contract."
In such a case the invitee is not given the power to immediately create a
legal obligation. 3 The invitor can reject any subsequent offers made to
him for any reason. Again, at this point the 1866 Act may not be
utilized since neither blacks nor whites can force an acceptance. The
situation is changed, however, when the sole reason for rejection of a
black 4 is his race. 5 Here a black is being denied the same right as a
son of his own, non-solicited act. Noble v. Williams, 150 Ky. 439, 150 S.W. 507
(1912).
90. Only in eminent domain proceedings may a property owner be forced to accept
an offer, and then only on the basis of the public good, not a private whim. See Mis-
souri Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896); City of Charlotte v. Heath, 226 N.C.
750, 40 S.E.2d 600 (1946). See generally 26 AM. JuR. 2D Eminent Domain §§ 25, 26
(1966). In Missouri Pacific the Court stated, "The taking by a State of the private
property of one person or corporation, without the owner's consent, for the private use
of another, is not due process of law, and is a violation of the Fourteenth Article of
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States." 164 U.S. at 417. Cf. Buchanan
v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 (1917): "Property is more than the mere thing which a
person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of
it. The Constitution protects these essential attributes of property. Property consists
of the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of a person's acquisitions without control or
diminution save by the law of the land." Accord, Lynch v. Household Finance Corp.,
405 U.S. 538, 544 (1972).
91. See Riley v. Adirondack S. School for Girls, 368 F. Supp. 392, 397-98 (M.D.
Fla. 1973).
92. See generally 1 A. Comnm, supra note 87, §§ 22-28. See also RESTATEmENT
OF CONTRACTS § 25 (1932).
93. It is open to both whites and blacks to prove, of course, that what one party
claimed to be an invitation was in reality an offer which was accepted by the plaintiff.
See, e.g., Jenkins Towel Serv., Inc. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 400 Pa. 98, 161
A.2d 334 (1960); Lefkowitz v. Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, Inc., 251 Minn. 188,
86 N.W.2d 689 (1957).
94. See Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974); Johnson v. Jerry
Pals Real Estate, 485 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1973). See also Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d
956 (5th Cir. 1975) (employment).
95. Whether a white plaintiff has standing under the 1866 Act has not yet been
definitively determined. Compare McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 513 F.2d
90 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. CL 264 (1975); Cahill v. Cedar County, 367 F. Supp.
39 (N.D. Iowa 1973), af 'd, 414 U.S. 806 (1974); Marshall v. Plumbers & Steamfitters
Local 60, 343 F. Supp. 70, 72 (E.D. La. 1972); Perkins v. Banster, 190 F. Supp. 98, 99
(D. Md.), a!f'd, 285 F.2d 426 (4th Cir. 1960); with Carter v Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315,
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white citizen because every comparably situated white citizen who so
desires will have entered into a contractual relationship with the former
invitorY6 The litigant's claim will be that he meets all the race-neutral
qualifications and reservations which prevented the invitation from
being an offer and, consequently, his rejection was solely due to race.9 7
If he proves such a claim, sections 1981 and 1982 require that he be
granted relief.
325 (8th Cir. 1971), modified, 452 F.2d 327 (en bane), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 44 U.S.L.W. 2379 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 29, 1976); Baca
v. Butz, 394 F. Supp. 888 (D.N.M. 1975); Hollander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F.
Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975). See also Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n,
410 U.S. 431 (1973) (whites brought action after their black guest was refused admis-
sion); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (a white was given
standing as the only effective adversary to redress discrimination against a black). See
generally Private Groups 1448 n.40; 21 WAYNE ST. L. Rnv. 157 (1974).
This Note throughout refers to blacks as the litigating class. Of course, if whites
are granted standing in a particular case, the appropriate designations can easily be re-
versed.
96. Since every similarly situated white will, by definition, have entered into a con-
tract, there will never be any challenge in the courts by a white person. It is exactly
because the invitor has entered into a contract with a white individual, or would have
if an appropriately situated white had presented himself, that a black meeting the same
nonracial criteria and with a prior or equal claim is not accorded the same right. In
such a situation it is confusing to regard the transactions as pre-contractual negotiations.
Except for the improper motivation, both parties would intend a binding, contractual re-
lationship. Thus, as opposed to the situation where an offer is extended but the con-
tract relationship denied after acceptance has taken place, only blacks will litigate this
issue. Compare Jenkins Towel Serv., Inc. v. Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co., 400 Pa.
98, 161 A.2d 334 (1960), with Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974).
An invitor may retract his invitation, of course, see Madison v. Jeffers, 494 F.2d
114 (4th Cir. 1974), but this technique may not be used as a subterfuge to escape deal-
ings with a black. Id. Cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973) (litigant alleging hiring discrimination must show that the employer continued
to seek applications for the opening after rejecting the plaintiff); Keely v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 404 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
97. The black litigant's burden of proof will be most easily met when a number of
whites have entered into the same contractual relationship which has been denied him.
See, e.g., McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 354
(1975). In such a case, every race-neutral qualification claimed by the invitor
must be satisfied by each white individual. A more difficult case is presented
when only one white has contracted, for then a defendant can try to pinpoint
any number of idiosyncracies which that individual may have and claim them as qualifi-
cations implicit in his invitation. See, e.g., Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634 (7th
Cir. 1974); cf. Brown, Givelber & Subrin, Treating Blacks, As If They Were White:
Problems of Definition and Proof in Section 1982 Cases, 124 U. PA. L. RaV. 1, 29-42
(1975). Harder yet to win will be the suit in which no whites have responded to the
invitation. See, e.g., Contract Buyers League v. F & F Investment, 300 F. Supp. 210
(N.D. Il1. 1969), aff'd sub nom. Baker v. F & F Investment, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970). Here an acceptable white class will have to be hy-
pothesized. Even this burden, however, is a function of the number of blacks rejected
since each will have to fail the race-neutral qualification(s) claimed by the defendant.
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Further examination of the "same right" language reveals, how-
ever, that an offeror or invitor can correspondingly restrict the scope of
sections 1981 and 1982 by limiting the class of offerees or invitees. To
continue the previous example, suppose that Smith offers his house to
five of his close associates, all of whom are white. Jones, seeking to
purchase the house, cannot use section 1982 to force Smith to sell to
him. The reason is clear. No white citizen outside Smith's small circle
of friends would have any right to compel a sale, and thus, even if
Smith's sole motive in refusing to sell to Jones is race, there is no relief.
The same result would obtain if Smith had endeavored to sell his house
by offering it to every white individual he met on Main Street, intention-
ally bypassing every black. In this circumstance, too, no white citizen
wh6 had not been approached would have any right to compel Smith to
sell him his home. Consequently, Jones, even if bypassed, would
similarly have no such right.98
Still another variation of this situation can be readily imagined.
Smith could place an advertisement in the local newspaper offering to
sell his house but attempt to restrict the offer by stating, "This offer is
only extended to members of the Caucasian race."99  Here, an action
under section 1982 would be available to Jones. Any white citizen
tendering the price asked in the ad would have a legal right to enforce
Smith's unilateral offer to sell. To allow Smith to exclude Jones from
the class of potential buyers by this simple device would be to deny to
Jones the "same right" that a white purchaser would have. Even
though Jones was never a member of the offeree class as defined by
Smith, section 1982 would be applicable. The courts have made this
point clear in holding that the class of offerees or invitees must be
defined only by race-neutral criteria. 100
98. It should be emphasized that the intimacy of the relationship is irrelevant. If
an offeror goes to the trouble of limiting the class of potential white offerees in a man-
ner which would guarantee that no excluded white would have an action, he has im-
munized himself from a section 1981 or 1982 action. In response to the objection that
this makes the sections too easy to evade, it can be argued that at least the sections
put significant barriers in the path of one who seeks to do so. In addition, such evasive
action would be financially impractical in the ordinary commercial setting where the
protection of rights is most far-reaching and significant.
99. Ignored here, of course, are the legalities of placing such an advertisement. Cf.
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973)
(upholding local ordinance which prohibited discrimination on the basis of race or sex
in advertising for employment opportunities).
100. McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1087-88 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S.
Ct. 354 (1975); Riley v. Adirondack S. School for Girls, 368 F. Supp. 392, 397-98
(M.D. Fla. 1973); cf. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431
(1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (status of a private
club was denied when the sole selective criterion was race). Just as excluding blacks
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Thus, the "same right to contract" guaranteed by section one of the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 is not intended to put legal compulsion behind
a private offer. It comes into play only when an offeror or invitor refuses
to contract with an individual solely because of his race. The key
inquiry is to ascertain the class of potential contracting parties, and at
that point to ask if both whites and nonwhites are treated equally.' 0'
C. Are There Constitutional Limitations to Section 1981?
The courts and commentators have assumed that section 1981 is
restricted in scope by the freedom of association and by an individual's
right of privacy. 102 In McCrary, although the majority found no viola-
tion of constitutional rights in its application of section 1981, the issues
were seriously discussed.10 3  These constitutional considerations, how-
ever, do not confine the application of the statute when it is properly
interpreted.
An independent "freedom of association" is a relatively recent
development in constitutional law. 04 The right is not expressly identi-
fied in either the national or state constitutions, 05 and its constitutional
underpinnings, 0 6 as well as the scope of its protection, 0 7 have not been
from membership does not make a private club, excluding blacks from an offer does not
limit the class of possible acceptors in a way that avoids sections 1981 or 1982.
101. It should be stressed that the reading of the statute suggested in the text would
not permit an evasion of its protection by the simple device of excluding some segment
of the white population. For instance, a geographic limitation would not immunize the
offeror from a section 1981 action, since those black persons who meet al other qualifi-
cations-including the geographical designation-could invoke the statute. Similarly,
the express exclusion of some whites on the basis of financial or educational criteria
would not protect against a section 1981 suit by a black who meets all the requirements.
Such an argument was put forth in McCrary: "It is contended here . . . that § 1981
confers no right of action unless the contract denied the aggrieved person was open to
all white people." 515 F.2d at 1087. The court rejected this argument, pointing out
that within the qualified class "there were no other limitation[s] upon the admission
of" any white applicant. Id. Thus, the Fourth Circuit's understanding of the scope of
section 1981 is not at odds with that suggested in this Note.
102. See, e.g., McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct.
354 (1975); Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D.
Conn. 1974); Comment, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., supra note 10, at 476-79; Private
Schools 1391-1400; 45 Miss. L.J. 246 (1974).
103. 515 F.2d at 1087-89.
104. A constitutional freedom of association was first announced in NAACP v. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). The notion of a freedom to associate, however, is
not so new. "The right of Americans freely to associate with whomever they choose
is universally recognized as fundamental in a democratic society." D. FELLmAN, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHr oF AssocunrxoN 34 (1963), citing Laski, Freedom of Associa-
tion, in VI ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 447-50 (1931).
105. D. FELLMAN, supra note 104, at 3.
106. Id. ("The broader rights of association have developed in part, out of the right
PRIVATE SCHOOLS
clearly articulated. Whether this constitutional freedom can be em-
ployed to protect the association of white children in a private school by
denying to blacks the opportunity to join the association was the ques-
tion before the McCrary court.
The dissent relied heavily on a primary/secondary distinction to
determine when the freedom of association should override other inter-
ests.10 8  While primary relationships are "basically relationships be-
tween friends" characterized by "intimate association," secondary rela-
tionships are "impersonal, highly formalized relations between
people."'109 To the dissent, the school situation involved a primary
relationship and thus section 1981 could not be constitutionally ap-
plied."10 Leaving aside the fact that application of a "primary relation-
ship" label to the facts of McCrary is highly questionable, the
primary/secondary distinction still should not be seen as the ultimate or
exclusive test for invoking the right of associational freedom over other
legitimate interests. Although helpful as an initial requirement, it
breaks down under even cursory analysis, for it is obvious that the state
has the power to regulate even the most primary of relationships. For
example, a husband and wife can be restrained from indulging in sexual
activity in public.:"' The primary/secondary distinction, then, does not
afford definitive guidance even in those situations where the freedom of
association and right to privacy can be legitimately applied.
Apart from the question of primary or secondary relationship, the
freedom of association cannot be legitimately utilized in a section 1981
action. It must be recalled that section 1981 applies only when race is
the sole motive for discrimination. Although private racial discrimin-
tion might be characterized as an exercise of the freedom to associate,
such discrimination has never been accorded affirmative constitutional
protections." 2 When the government, through section 1981, seeks to
of assembly, and in part out of broader due process concepts."); Emerson, Freedom of
Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 2 (1964).
107. See note 115 infra.
108. 515 F.2d at 1095 (dissenting opinion).
109. Id., quoting Comment, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., supra note 10, at 478.
The original source of the distinction is found in Sengstock & Sengstock, Discrimination:
A Constitutional Dilemma, 9 WM. & MARY L. REv. 59, 117 (1967).
110. 515 F.2d at 1095 (dissenting opinion).
111. See, e.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.570(2) (1972); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.20(1)
(1958)..
112. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 (1973). As previously noted, the
Court in Norwood specifically mentioned in this context that even some private discrim-
ination is subject to legislation, like section 1981, which is promulgated under the thir-
teenth amendment. Id. See also Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, 410
U.S. 431 (1973) (status as a private club denied when sole selection criterion was race);
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compel personal associations which are resisted solely on the basis of
race, the constitutional right of association simply is not involved." 3
Where the issue is not whether a group of people will be permitted to
associate for a specified purpose, but whether they can exclude others
from that association for whatever reason, the right being asserted is one
of non-association. Such an asserted right more appropriately falls
under the rubric of privacy."' As a result, the freedom of association
may not be invoked as a bar to application of section 198 1."1
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); McCrary v. Runyon, 515
F.2d 1082, 1087-88 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 354 (1975) ("Among pri-
vate schools, they are free to prefer one with a certain curriculum or dogma over others,
but the school, while it may exclude applicants on the basis of neutral principles, may
not exclude on the basis of race.").
113. But see Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting), quoted in McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1095 (4th Cir. 1975) (Russell,
Field, & Widener, JJ., dissenting) ("The associational rights which our system honors
permit all white, all black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed. . . .Govern-
ment may not tell a man or woman who his or her associates must be. The individual
can be as selective as he desires.").
114. See Emerson, supra note 106, at 20-21.
115. The freedom of association has been applied to political, social, economic, re-
ligious, recreational, and cultural groups. See generally C. RICE, FREEDOM OF AssocA-
TION (1962); Note, Association, Privacy and the Private Club: The Constitutional Con-
flict, 5 HARv. Civ. RiGrrrs-Civ. Lmi. L. Rnv. 460 (1970). The freedom to associate has
been linked to the first amendment freedom of expression. Norwood v. Harrison, 413
U.S. 455, 469-70 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965); Bell v.
Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
It has been argued by at least one commentator that due to its compulsory nature,
education falls outside the ambit of the freedom of association. In those cases where
the freedom has been invoked, the members of the group of their own free will decided
whether to join any group or no group. "The student, however, may not decide whether
to go to school. The only voluntary decision the student may make, except for pre-
school education and education in excess of the amount required by law, is which school
to attend." 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 767, 770 (1973) (footnote omitted). There is at least
some support for the proposition that the student has a constitutional right to make
a free choice in this regard, for Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966), speaks of "the
right of the individual to pick his own asssociates so as to express his preferences and
dislikes, and to fashion his private life by joining such clubs and groups as he chooses."
Id. at 298. See also Is 1981 the Answer? 1170 ("Although [discriminatory admission
policies] allow white children to choose to associate only with other whites, they do
not accommodate the choice of black children to associate freely with white children.").
See generally Comment, Discrimination in Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Associa-
tion and Right to Privacy, 1970 DuKE L.J. 1181, 1208.
More to the point, however, is the reality that the child is not actually making an
informed choice about which school to attend. "[W]hat are basically at issue here are
not the associational rights of a student who desires colleagues of a certain color, but
the rights of parents to be certain their children receive racially restricted education."
Is 1981 the Answer? 1170 (footnote omitted). See also King, Rebuilding the "Fallen
House"-State Tuition Grants for Elementary and Secondary Education, 84 HARv. L.
R v. 1057, 1078 (1971). See generally Private Groups 1458 (finds little support for
a broad freedom of association concept); 11 Hous'roN L. REv. 691, 696-97 (1974)
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Similarly, the right of privacy has no relevance in a section 1981
action. The fact overlooked by those asserting such a limitation is that
section 1981 does not force anyone to accept an offer. It operates only
against an individual who has voluntarily initiated contractual relations
with a personally unidentified group.:""
The McCrary majority gave the following hypothetical: "Should
siblings combine to employ tutors for their children, they may exclude
the rest of the world, for the rule of exclusivity bars the more distantly
related and the unrelated regardless of race."'11 Here the court focused
on the fact that there was a nonracial reason for rejecting a section 1981
claim. But the rationale issue need not have been raised at all, for in the
hypothetical the sibling school made no offer to educate others.1 8  The
statute would not come to the aid of a nonwhite outsider who offered a
sum of money for his child's admission into the school.
A common example thought to demonstrate the constitutional
limits of section 1981 was given in Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective
Order of Elks:"'
[A] black man could not bring an action against a white woman alleg-
ing that she had refused to consider marrying him because of his race.
Marriage is a contractual relationship -but it is also one of the most
private of relationships, and this privacy interest has constitutional
dimensions. . . . There is, thus, a constitutional brake on section
1981.120
The error in this analysis is not that the right of privacy does not extend
this far. The true error lies in alleging that section 1981 does. In the
above situation, the man is the initiator, not the woman, and therefore
section 1981 is inapplicable.
It can also be easily demonstrated from a practical standpoint that
the right of privacy is not a constitutional restriction on section 1981.121
It is clear that the right extends only to the most private and intimate of
situations. 2  Section 1981 does not come into play, however, unless
(freedom of association not a bar to section 1981 education action); 7 LOYOLA OF
L.A.L. REV. 634, 650 (1974) (freedom of association not a bar in education if not a bar
in obscene films); 45 Miss. L.J. 246 (1974) (calls for balancing of commercial and
associational interests in education to see which predominates).
116. See notes 84-101 supra and accompanying text.
117. 515 F.2d at 1088-89.
118. Cf. Cook v. Advertiser Co., 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972); Kyles v. Calcasien
Parish Sheriff's Dep't, 395 F. Supp. 1307 (W.D. La. 1975).
119. 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Conn. 1974).
120. Id. at 1198, citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
121. This argument also applies in many situations to the freedom of association.
122. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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the offeror or invitor initiates the contractual relationship without specif-
ically identifying the offeree or invitee. 25 In such a case the requisite
intimacy and privacy are entirely lacking. The contracts involved in a
1981 action consequently will always be too commercial and involve too
great a degree of publicity to be afforded constitutional protection. 124
123. An offer or invitation to join a group can be made to an individual or group
whose personal identity is wholly ascertained, partially ascertained, or unascertained.
The simplest case is that of a single individual asked to join a group. If he alone is
asked there can be no section 1981 discrimination since he is the sole member of the
invited class. (It would be specious to argue that he would ever be denied admission af-
ter such an explicit offer has been given. Even if this does occur, the reasons would
undoubtedly be nonracial since that factor in this human equation is a constant.) The
same reasoning pertains to a fully identified group of invitees. The point is that the
offering group would not extend the offer to a black individual or group if they knew
the identity of the class and had a discriminatory intent. In many situations, however,
the offer is extended to a group which is not wholly identified. It is in this open-ended
offer/invitation situation, where blacks meet all other qualifications of the class but are
denied a contractual relationship solely because of their race, that section 1981 comes
into operation. See text accompanying notes 84-101 supra. See also note 124 infra.
124. Perhaps an example would clarify this point. Group A is a small group of close
friends who meet together at B's invitation every week to swim in B's pool. (It is clear
at this point that no one can legally force his entrance into this group.) But occasion-
ally a member of the group will move to another town. At that point in time B decides
to whom among his acquaintances he will offer the vacant place. In such a case the
class of offerees is made up of only one person. If he happens to be nonwhite, it is
obvious that no section 1981 action will occur since his acceptance of the offer of mem-
bership will never be rejected. (Even more basic, section 1981 will not apply to this sit-
uation because there is no contractual relationship since B receives no consideration for
his generosity. See Cook v. Advertiser Co., 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972); Kyles v.
Calcasien Parish Sheriff's Dep't, 395 F. Supp. 1307, 1310-11 (W.D. La. 1975)).
On the other hand, a different situation presents itself if, after member X departs,
B decides to fill the vacant position by advertising in the local newspaper that upon re-
ceipt of $500 any male in Town T may join the swimming group. In that case, as-
suming the advertising constitutes an offer, the class of offerees includes all male mem-
bers of Town T. Within that class, section 1981 guarantees that whites and nonwhites
will be treated equally. But B has no idea of the ultimate acceptor's personal identity
at the time he makes the offer. Such a transaction is too commercial to be afforded
constitutional protection as a matter of "privacy." As stated in McCrary, "[wihen a
school holds itself open to the public, . . . there is no perceived privacy of the sort that
has been given constitutional protection." 515 F.2d 'at 1088. See also Cornelius v.
Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1204 (D. Conn. 1974) ('To
have their privacy protected, clubs must function as extensions of members' homes and
not as extensions of their businesses. Racial prejudice will not be permitted to infect
channels of commerce under the guise of 'privacy.'"). The intriguing practical point is
that section 1981 will almost never be used except in situations where an offer has been
held open to the public. Holding an offer open to the public means extending it to those
whom one has not personally approached. No right of privacy attaches to such a rela-
tionship.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq. (1970), provides an ex-
emption for private clubs:
The provisions of this subehapter shall not apply to a private club or
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In summary, section 1981 extends to all private contracts but only
comes into play when an individual voluntarily initiates contractual
relations, then reneges at consummation solely on the basis of race.125
When the statute is interpreted in this manner, section 1981 actions are
not restrained by the right of privacy or freedom of association. 126
other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the
facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons
of an establishment within the scope of subsection (b) of this section. Id. §
2000a(e).
In light of the saving clause, id. § 2000a-6(b), it seems probable that the private club
exception would also apply to section 1981 actions. Cf. United States v. Johnson, 390
U.S. 563, 566 (1967). Some courts have so held. See Cornelius v. Benevolent Protec-
tive Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Conn. 1974); Solomon v. Miami Woman's
Club, 359 F. Supp. 41 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Simms v. Order of Commercial Travelers, 343
F. Supp. 112, 113-14 (D. Mass. 1972). It is also clear, however, that race alone is not
a valid selective factor. A club which excludes only blacks does not qualify for the ex-
emption. See Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431, 438 (1973);
Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969); Nesmith v. Y.M.C.A.,
397 F.2d 96, 102 (4th Cir. 1968); Solomon v. Miami Woman's Club, 359 F. Supp. 41,
44 (S.D. Fla. 1973). See generally Note, Private Clubs: The Right to Discriminate in
Admissions Policies, 34 U. PrTT. L. REv. 447 (1973); Private Groups 1452-55.
The purported conflict between section 1981 and private clubs is more imagined
than real. Although it has been held that "[g]overnment may not tell a man or woman
who his or her associates must be," Gilmore v. Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974),
quoting Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 180 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting), sec-
tion 1981 does not attempt to force a contract on anyone or any group. It does not
mandate association. Since the section does not sweep so broadly, there is no conflict
with the privacy of private clubs.
125. It is true that in the example given in note 124 supra there is room for manipu-
lation in order to exclude blacks from membership. The courts have not been fooled
in the past, however. See, e.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S.
431 (1973); Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1974). In
addition courts have delineated stringent requirements which a private club must meet.
Factors include the selectiveness of the group in the admission of members, the existence
of formal membership procedures, the membership control over internal governance, the
history of the organization, the use of facilities by nonmembers, the substantiality of
dues, the club's decision concerning advertising, and the predominance of the profit mo-
tive. See Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1203
(D. Conn. 1974). See generally Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Stout v.
Y.M.C.A., 404 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1968).
It should be remembered that section 1981's "same right to make and enforce con-
tracts" does not apply unless there is an enforceable contractual relationship present. See
Cook v. Advertiser Co., 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972); Player v. Dep't of Pensions
& Security, 400 F. Supp. 249, 265 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
126. Contract law reflects to a large extent the privacy notions of the populace. Al-
though breach of promise to marry actions were permitted a century ago when a mar-
riage contract was often an arms-length transaction, today such actions are prohibited
by statute in many states. See 12 Am. Jut. 21 Breach of Promise §§ 18-20 (1964);
Annot., 73 A.L.R.2D 553 (1960). This undoubtedly stems in large part from the fact
that today the marriage contract is considered a much more intimate and personal
choice. In other words, it is a much less commercial transaction in the modern world.
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PROGNOSTICATION: EXPANSION OF THE
SECTION 1981 REMEDY IN EDUCATION
Undoubtedly there were those in 1954 who believed that the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education'2 7 marked
the end of the black man's long struggle for equality in education. If so,
they were to be sorely disappointed. Brown, however, does provide an
effective weapon with which to fight the battle in the public schools. It
now appears that the Supreme Court will allow the battle to be acted out
on an additional front. The key question remaining, therefore, is
whether the provision of section 1981 that nonwhites have the same
right as white citizens to make contracts guarantees equal education as
well as equal admissions.
Following Brown, numerous attempts were made to circumvent
that decision's clear intent to provide equal education for blacks. Even
open resistance was attempted.'2 More commonly the "all deliberate
speed" requirement of Brown 11129 was stretched almost beyond recog-
nition. -3 0 Even after blacks entered the schoolhouse door, however,
they encountered obstacles to an equal education. 3' Examples included
the maintenance of segregated classes within outwardly integrated
schools, 32 the use of "ability groupings,"'1 3 and improper utilization of
I. Q. and achievement tests.' 34
127. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
128. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (National Guard units kept black students
from entering public high school because of public hostility). See also Bush v. School
Bd., 188 F. Supp. 916 (E,D. La.), aff'd, 365 U.S. 569 (1961) (state "interposition stat-
ute" declared invalid).
129. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
130. See Alexander v. Board of Educ., 396 U.S. 19 (1969); Green v. County School
Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Bradley v. School Bd., 382 U.S. 103 (1965); Griffin v.
County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Bell v. Rippy, 146 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Tex.
1956), rev'd sub nom. Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1957). See also Holt
v. Board of Educ., 265 F.2d 95 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959); Covington
v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 840 (1959); Carson v. War-
lick, 238 F.2d 724 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 910 (1957) (demonstrates many
of procedural and administrative hurdles placed in way of integration); Kelley v. Board
of Educ., 270 F.2d 209 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 924 (1959); Slade v. Board
of Educ., 252 F.2d 291 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 906 (1958) (demonstrates the
gradual, grade-at-a-time integration process). See generally R. SAYLES, Tim WARREN
COURT: A CRICAL ANALYSIS 46 et seq. (1969).
131. See generally D. BELL, RACE, RACIsM AND AMEmCAN LAw 471-97 (1973).
132. See Jackson v. Marvell School Dist. No. 22, 425 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1970).
133. See Moses v. Washington Parish School Bd., 330 F. Supp. 1340 (E.D. La.
1971),
134. See Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 410 (D.D.C. 1967), af'd sub nom. Smuck
v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (system of "tracking" students struck down).
But cf. Pettit v. Board of Educ., 184 F. Supp. 452 (D. Md. 1960).
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Does section 1981, then, provide only a hollow right to contract in
the education field by taking a black child to the schoolhouse door but
not accompanying him inside? The answer is very probably "no."
Section 1981 gives the same or equal right to contract to a black man
that a white man enjoys. The black man has not just contracted with a
private school for the admission of his child. He has contracted for that
child's education. If that child receives discriminatory treatment once
inside the schoolhouse, the parent is not receiving the same value for his
investment that a white man is. 135 Simply put, he is not receiving the
same right to contract.
There is authority for this position in the case law. In Jones the
Court spoke in strong words, stating that the thirteenth amendment is
not a "mere paper guarantee" and that it assures that "a dollar in the
hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands
of a white man."' 36
This language was taken quite seriously in both Sullivan and
Tillman. In both cases the property rights of the plaintiffs were seen to
be diluted because otherwise automatic membership options in recrea-
tional facilities were denied them solely on account of their race. A
unanimous Court elaborated in Tillman:
When an organization links membership benefits to residency in
a narrow geographical area, that decision infuses those benefits into
the bundle of rights for which an individual pays when buying or leas-
ing within the area. The mandate of ...§ 1982 then operates to
guarantee a nonwhite resident ... the same rights as are enjoyed by a
white resident.137
135. As a matter of law such discriminatory education is inferior. See Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C.
1967), aff'd sub nor. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
In the district court in the McCrary litigation the Southern Independent School As-
sociation, as intervenor, proffered testimony to show that "segregation is desirable in
education in light of the performance of these schools and current scientific theory
.... " Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200, 1204 (E.D. Va.
1973), affd sub nom. McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96
S. Ct. 354 (1975). The court deemed such testimony legally irrelevant due to its rejec-
tion in Brown. But see Bell v. Rippy, 146 F. Supp. 485 (N.D. Tex. 1956), rev'd sub
nom. Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1957).
136. The following is the full text of the passage:
Negro citizens, North and South, who saw in the Thirteenth Amendment a
promise of freedom-freedom to "go and come at pleasure" and to "buy and
sell when they please"-would be left with "a mere paper guarantee" if Con-
gress were powerless to assure that a dollar in the hands of a Negro will pur-
chase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a white man. At the very
least, the freedom that Congress is empowered to secure under the Thirteenth
Amendment includes the freedom to buy whatever a white man can buy, the
right to live wherever a white man can live. If Congress cannot say that being
a free man means at least this much, then the Thirteenth Amendment made a
promise the Nation cannot keep. 392 U.S. at 443 (citations omitted).
137. 410 U.S. at 437.
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If membership options in a pool are part of the "bundle of rights"
protected when one buys a house, it seems clear that an equal education
is part of the "bundle of rights" contracted for when one places a child
in private school. Many individuals when purchasing a house are
totally indifferent to such recreation options and it would be the rare
case indeed when it was a controlling factor. In the school situation, on
the other hand, a parent always expects his child to receive equal
educational opportunities and facilities. He only enrolls his child in a
private school if he anticipates more benefits than are offered by the
public schools of the area. The quality of education is not only part of
the bundle of rights for which he is contracting, it is the whole bundle.
It seems very likely that there will be redress in the private school
situation under section 1981 for the same types of evasions, and even
good-intentioned procedures, which have caused discriminatory and
unequal education in the public schools. Since segregated classes, like
segregated school systems, are inherently unequal,13 8 a parent of a black
child otherwise would not be receiving the same right to contract as the
parent of a white child. Section 1981 assures that "a dollar in the
hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands
of a white man."' 30  Nowhere is this more important than in educa-
tion.14 0
138. See Brown v. Board of Edue., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Jackson v. Marvell School
Dist. No. 22, 425 F.2d 211 (8th Cir. 1970).
139. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968).
140. The courts in applying section 1981 to education may rely in large part on anal-
ogous case law. With respect to subtle discrimination in the classroom, recourse can
be had to the decisions following Brown. See notes 128-135 supra. As to the burden
of proof in such action, the courts may generally look to the procedures adopted in sec-
tion 1982 actions, see Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1021 (1974); Olzman v. Lake Hills Swim Club, Inc., 495 F.2d 1333, 1340-
42 (2d Cir. 1974); Note, Racial Discrimination in Public Housing, Rights and Reme-
dies, 41 U. CM. L. REv. 582 (1974), and section 1981 employment cases, see Larson,
The Development of Section 1981 as a Remedy for Racial Discrimination in Private Em-
ployment, 7 HARv. Civ. PRGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 56 (1972). See also Brown, Givelber
& Subrin, supra note 97; Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrim-
ination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARv. L. Rnv. 387 (1975).
Another commentator suggests a two-step analysis. First, does the defendant have
a history of racial discrimination? Second, are there facts indicating racial discrimina-
tion against this particular plaintiff? 42 U. CiN. L. REv. 767 (1973). See also Is 1981
the Answer? 1174-75 (argues that where there is a history of rejecting all or substan-
tially all blacks, the burden should be on the school to disprove discrimination, this
being particularly crucial when subjective reasons are given for the rejection); Private
Groups 1474 (suggesting that past admissions criteria should be frozen so that subjective
factors cannot be used as a screen for discrimination); cf. Fiss, Gaston County v.
United States: Fruition of the Freezing Principle, 1969 Sup. Cr. Rav. 379.
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CONCLUSION
The increasing importance of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is
evidenced by its ever-extending reach into private action. This exten-
sion is not without limitation, however, for while section 1981 does
indeed reach even to private educational activity, the statute is applica-
ble only when a nonwhite otherwise qualifies to enter into a contractual
relationship which has been aborted solely because of the element of
race. It must also be remembered that section 1981 aids only those
who are attempting to accept an open-ended offer or invitation and who
constitute part of the qualified class to whom it has been extended. On
the other hand, a proper application of section 1981 is not limited by the
constitutional issues of associational freedom and the right to privacy.
The impact of McCrary on private education cannot yet be mea-
sured. Each action brought under section 1981 will require careful
analysis of school policy, both past and present, and the child's individu-
al qualifications. It is clear, however, that McCrary requires considera-
tion of each child on his merits as a person and not on the color of his
skin.' 4 ' This badge and incident of slavery has rightly been put to rest.
141. See Borders v. Rippy, 247 F.2d 268, 271 (5th Cir. 1957) (fourteenth amend-
ment): "Pupils may, of course, be separated according to their degree of advancement
or retardation, their ability to learn, on account of their health, or for any other legiti-
mate reason, but each child is entitled to be treated as an individual without regard to
his race or color."
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